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A Typology of Mediation in Homer1
Keith Dickson
The tale of Iliad 1 proceeds along a linear course punctuated by crises at 
which alternative paths come into sight; choices are made, as if at crossroads, and 
then the narrative continues along the path ostensibly determined by those choices. 
What more specifi cally structures its progress is a rhythm of Crisis, Mediation, and 
Response, in which the latter event rarely marks a true narrative closure, but instead 
only opens out on further crises, paths that fork and fork again. A priest’s appeal for 
restitution of his daughter is rejected by a king, and plague ensues. The mediation 
of a prophet leads on the one hand to approval and the propitiation of offended 
deity, but on the other to strife between warrior and king. An elder’s attempt to 
mediate their confl ict (in which the successful intercession of a goddess is itself 
embedded) fails to win acceptance, and the warrior withdraws from society. His 
crisis triggers a second divine intervention in the form of an appeal to the highest 
god, whose acquiescence on the one hand subordinates all the subsequent narrative 
to the guidance of a Plan, at the same time as it generates confl ict with yet another 
deity. The book closes with successful mediation of their strife, with everything 
ostensibly right in heaven, though impending disaster among mortals.
This study attempts to disengage the event of Mediation from its central place 
in this narrative course in order to map its contours better. Its point of departure—no 
more or less arbitrary than any beginning—is a formulaic line. The address-formula 
o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato kai; meteveipen [He in kind intention toward all 
stood forth and addressed them] (9X, 6X) introduces the intercessory speeches of 
1 This study is the result of work done as a participant in the 1989 National Endowment 
for the Humanities Summer Seminar on “Oral Tradition in Literature” held at the University of 
Missouri at Columbia under the directorship of John Miley Foley. For support, insight, good humor, 
and especially openness to dialogue, I would like to express my graditute to John Foley and to all 
members of the seminar: Gayle Henrotte, Carolyn Higbie, Wayne Kraft, Eric Montenyohl, Jane 
Morrissey, James Pearce, Lea Olsan, Roslyn Raney, Harry Robie, and John Wilson.
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Kalkhas (73) and Nestor (253) in Iliad 1; despite (and because of) their failure, 
their infl uence on the progress and direction of the ensuing narrative is critical.2 
The formula not only implicitly adverts to functional parallels between them, but 
also situates both within a well-defi ned group of similar fi gures in Homer. A clear 
typology of the Mediator emerges from examination of the characters with whom 
the formula is associated and the contextual parameters in which it is used.
1: Ethos
While the formula appears nine times without variation in the Iliad (1.73;253, 
2.78;283, 7.326;367, 9.95, 15.285, 18.253) and six times in the Odyssey (2.160;228, 
7.158, 16.399, 24.53;453), in the latter poem it also accommodates a small number 
of allomorphs. The shape most frequently taken follows the “he addressed him with 
qualifi cation” pattern analyzed by M. Edwards,3 which in place of the hemistich #o{ 
sfin eju>fronevwn admits two instances (Od. 2.24, 24.425) of #tou` o{ ge davkru 
cevwn [shedding a tear for his sake] in lines widely separated but thematically quite 
close. In each case, the qualifying phrase is used with reference to an aged father’s 
grief in remembrance of his deceased son—Aigyptios for Antiphos in the fi rst 
Ithakan Assembly (Od. 2), Eupeithes for Antinoos at the beginning of the informal 
assembly of Ithakans in Book 24—and in the second of these two passages the 
#tou` o{ ge davkru cevwn hemistich is repeated at the close of the speech that it was 
used to introduce (Od. 24.438). This apparent restriction of the formula to instances 
of goodwill and sorrow displayed by elderly fi gures is itself an interesting one; its 
signifi cance will be explored later. The other cases of the line with ajgorhvsato kai; 
meteveipen# fi lling the second hemistich take the form of #toi`sin d∆ - u u -, with 
the name of the speaker (Alkinoos 3X, Amphinomos 3X, Antinoos 1X) substituting 
for the qualifying /participle/ or /noun + participle/ in the space between the A1 and 
B1 caesura.
Speeches introduced by o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato kai; meteveipen 
show similar patterning. The line in each case serves to mark the following speaker 
as an authority-fi gure whose advice implicitly deserves the attention and approval 
of his audience. Respect accrues to the 
2 The text of Homer used in this study is that of the standard Oxford edition. English 
translations of important lines and phrases (meant more as an aid to the Greekless than as definitive 
renderings) are those of Lattimore 1961 and 1965, with occasional (and slight) adaptation.
3 Edwards 1970:10-12. See also the related studies by the same author in the list of 
references.
 A TYPOLOGY OF MEDIATION IN HOMER 39
speaker in most instances because of his great age; fully two-thirds (10 of 15X) 
of all uses of the formula predicate it of old men. This is obviously the case with 
Nestor himself (Il. 1.253, 2.78, 7.326, 9.95; Od. 24.53), whose longevity forms the 
core of his ethical type, and with whom the whole-line formula is indeed most often 
(5X = 33%) used.4 But it applies equally to other elders as well: Priam (Il. 7.367), 
Halitherses (Od. 2.160, 4.453), Mentor (Od. 2.228), and the Phaiakian Ekheneos 
(Od. 7.153). The type of the Elder in fact comes to expression by recourse to a 
small complex of idioms in these ten instances, which in addition to the intentional 
markers of Goodwill (or Sorrow) also make reference to the Elder’s circumspection 
and the temporal scope of his knowledge. Thus Halitherses (Od. 2.188), Ekheneos 
(Od. 7.157), and Nestor (Od. 24.51) are all qualifi ed by the closing hemistich 
palaiav te pollav te eijdwv~# [knowing many ancient things], which (though 
based on the extensive endline formula - u u eijdwv~#) appears nowhere else in 
either poem. Moreover, the formula for circumspection, oJ ga;r oi|o~ o{ra provssw 
kai; ojpivssw# [who alone looked both ahead and behind], closing the line after a 
patronymic (Panqoi?dh~ / Mastorivdh~) that extends as far as the A2 caesura, is 
found only with reference to Halitherses (Od. 24.452) and the Trojan Poulydamas 
(Il. 18.250)—who despite his youth embodies many of the features traditionally 
associated with advanced age. An enjambed line with the same formula as far as the 
B2 caesura also characterizes Halitherses in Od. 2.158-59: Mastorivdh~ oJ ga;r 
oi|o~ oJmilikivhn ejkevkasto ⁄ o[rniqa~ gnw`nai [Mastor’s son, for he alone of his 
generation | knew the meaning of birdfl ight]. An allomorph of the line with provssw 
kai; ojpivssw# after the C2 caesura—but admitting a different fi rst hemistich and 
the substitution of a{ma for o{ra—in one instance (Il. 1.343) denies precisely this 
capacity to Agamemnon (oujdev ti oi\de noh`sai a{ma provssw kai; ojpivssw [and 
has not wit enough to look ahead and behind]), and in the other (with enjambement 
of the verb) serves to represent Priam as an exemplary elder by contrast with the 
impetuousness of young men (Il. 3.108-10):
§1 aijei; d∆ oJplotevrwn ajndrw`n frevn(e~ hjerevqontai:
 oi|~ d∆ oJ gevrwn metevh/sin, a{ma provssw kai; ojpivssw
 leuvssei, o{pw~ o[c∆ a[rista met∆ ajmfotevroisi gevnhtai.
4 The bibliography on the figure of Nestor, apart from attempts to associate him with the 
archaeology of Pylos, is relatively sparse. Except for Vester 1956, most studies concentrate on 
individual scenes or speeches. See, e.g., Cantieni 1942, Davies 1986, Lang 1983, Pedrick 1983, 
Segal 1971, and occasional remarks in Frame 1978 (esp. 81-115) and Whitman 1958. 
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 Always it is, that the hearts in the younger men are frivolous,
 but when an elder man is among them, he looks behind him
 and in front, so that all comes out far better for both sides.
Specifi c details of this characterization will concern us shortly. The remaining 
fi ve instances of the whole-line formula o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato kai; 
meteveipen, though predicated of young or middle-aged men, only serve all the 
more to confi rm the priority of the Elder as intercessory fi gure. We have already 
noted the responsion between Halitherses and Poulydamas in the shared formula: 
/Patronymic/ + oJ ga;r oi|o~ o{ra provssw kai; ojpivssw. Though coeval with 
Hektor and in fact the hero’s Double,5 Poulydamas in his capacity for circumspection 
plays expressly the role of older man in their confrontation on the Trojan plain. He 
approaches the paradigm of the Elder more closely than do any of the other younger 
men (Odysseus, Thoas, Amphimonos) connected with the address-formula, for the 
contrast between rhetorical and military prowess in whose terms he is opposed to 
Hektor (Il. 18.252) is precisely what traditionally distinguishes old men from young 
ones. This much is clear from Nestor’s own qualifi cation of his praise for Diomedes 
in Iliad 9.53f.;56-59:
§2 Tudei?dh, peri; me;n polevmw/, e[ni kavrterov~ ejssi
 kai; boulh`/ meta; pavnta~ oJmhvlika~ e[pleu a[risto~
 . . .
  . . .ajta;r ouj tevlo~ i{keo muvqwn.
 h\ me;n kai; nevo~ ejssiv, ejmo;~ dev ke kai; pavi>~ ei[h~
 oJplovtato~ geneh`fin: ajta;r pepnumevna bavzei~
 ∆Argeiw`n basilh`~, ejpei; kata; moi`ran e[eipe~.
 Son of Tydeus, beyond others you are strong in battle,
 and in counsel also are noblest among all men of your own age.
 . . .
  . . .Yet you have not made complete your argument,
 since you are a young man still and could even be my own son
 and my youngest born of all; yet still you argue in wisdom
 with the Argive kings, for all you have spoken was spoken fairly.
The same sentiment is expressed at, e.g., Odyssey 3.124-25 and 4.204-5.
Circumspection, linked with command of persuasive rhetoric, is likewise 
associated with the other young men to whom the formula ascribes goodwill. Thus 
Odysseus (no untried youth but hardly a greybeard) 
5 On Patroklos as Double, see Redfield 1975:143, Willcock 1976 (at 11.57-60).
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addresses the Akhaian Assembly after his rebuke of Thersites with scepter in 
hand—#e[sth skh`ptron e[cwn [he stood holding the sceptre] (whose closest 
parallel is the hemistich #skh`ptron e[cwn eJsthvkei used at Il. 18.557 to describe 
the paradigmatic King depicted on the Shield)—while beside him Athene in the 
likeness of a herald enjoins silence on the crowd (Il. 2.279-83). Here above all else 
the intersection of Mediator with Counselor is evident. The link becomes clearer in 
the case of the Aitolian Thoas (Il. 15.281-85). Along with his prowess as a fi ghter 
(ejpistamevno~ me;n a[konti | ejsqlo;~ d∆ ejn stadivh/ [skilled in the spear’s throw 
| and brave in close fi ght]), his skills in debate are remarkable for one so young: 
ajgorh`/ dev eJ pau`roi ∆Acaiw`n ⁄ nivkwn, oJppovte kou`roi ejrivsseian peri; 
mu`qon [In assembly few of the Akhaians | when the young men contended in debate 
could outdo him]. The status Thoas enjoys is in fact marked in an earlier passage 
(Il. 13.215-18) in which Poseidon assumes his voice—#eijsavmeno~ fqogghvn 
(cf. the allomorph #ei[sato de; fqogghvn used of Iris’ impersonation of Polites 
at Il. 2.791)—to address Idomeneus. Similar features characterize Amphinomos in 
the Odyssey (16.394-99). His control of speech more than that of any other suitor 
pleased Penelope, since his intentions were the best: mavlista de; Phnelopeivh/ 
⁄ h{ndane muvqoisi, fresi; ga;r kevcrht∆ ajgaqh`/sin [and he pleased Penelope 
| more than the others in talk, for he had good sense and discretion]. The end-line 
formula fresi; ga;r kevcrht∆ ajgaqh`/sin# is elsewhere used only of Klytaimestra 
prior to her seduction (Od. 3.266) and of Eumaios (Od. 14.421), to describe his 
reverence for the gods.
The association of age with persuasive rhetoric runs throughout the 
representation of the elders whose words the o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato kai; 
meteveipen formula introduces. Nestor is not only one of the major proponents of 
practical intelligence (mh`ti~) in the Iliad (cf. 7.324-25 = 9.93-94, 23.311-18), but 
also and chiefl y the paradigm of the orator, the ligu;~ ajgorhthv~ “from whose tongue 
the voice fl owed sweeter than honey” (Il. 1.251). The hemistich ligu;~ Pulivwn 
ajgorhthv~# [lucid speaker of Pylos], fi lling the line after the B2 caesura, is repeated 
once elsewhere (Il. 4.293), when Nestor calls his troops to order. Its allomorph, 
liguv~ per ejw;n ajgorhthv~ [although a lucid speaker], appears on three occasions 
(Il. 2.246, 19.82; Od. 20.274); here the sense is concessive, and its contrast with the 
formula used of Nestor is an interesting one. The allomorphic versions all occur in 
speech, not diegesis, and advert to a speaker’s failure to command the respect or 
attention of his audience. In Iliad 19, an apologetic Agamemnon acknowledges the 
diffi culty faced by even the best orator when confronted by an unruly crowd. In the 
Odyssey passage, its tone is sarcastic: Antinoos taunts Telemakhos and threatens to 
shut his mouth permanently, lucid 
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speaker that he is. Equally biting is its use by Odysseus in Iliad 2 to refer to 
Thersites—whose physical ugliness (212-20) is an index of even more repellent 
social deformities, and whose role in the narrative is precisely the opposite of 
Nestor’s. Elsewhere, forms of the adjective liguv~ (alone or compounded) skew 
their reference between the natural and human worlds, from the “shrillness”  of 
birdsong (2X), whip (1X), and wind (6X) to the keening of mourners (5X), the lure 
of Seirenes (1X), the lyre’s sweet piercing sound (7X), and the lucid quality of the 
herald’s voice (6X).
In this context, it is in fact worth a slight digression from the ethos of the 
Mediator to note the intersection of the traits of rhetorical prowess, advanced age, 
and goodwill in the related fi gure of the herald (kh`rux). Of the 88 instances of the 
noun in its various infl ections, only one-fi fth (18X) exhibit adjectival or clausal 
modifi cation. This ranges from simple epithets (most of which survive as hapax 
legomena) such as ligufqovggoisi (5X), ajgauoiv# (2X), ajstubowvthn#(1C), 
hjpuvta (1X), and hjerofwvnwn# (1X), to clauses like Dio;~ a[ggeloi hjde; kai; 
ajndrw`n# [messengers of gods and men] (2X) or oi} dhmioergoi; e[asin# [who 
serve the demos] (1X). The largest group of modifi ers (5X)—to which must be 
added an additional fi ve instances (for a total of 10 of 23X = 43%) in which the 
common noun is replaced by the name of the herald—clusters around the trait of 
“sagacity” or “prudence” that comes to expression uniquely in formulas built upon 
the ubiquitous participle pepnumen-:
§3 A . . . pepnumevnw a[mfw#   (2X)
 B . . . pepnuvmena eijdwv~#    (4X, of
           Medon)
 C . . . pepnuvmena mhvdea eijdwv~#  (2X) 
 D . . . fivla fresi; mhvdea eijdwv~#  (1X)
and cf. E . . . pukina; fresi; mhvde∆ e[conte~# (2X)
The last example (E) is used on both occasions of Priam and his aged herald, and 
should be compared with its allomorph e[sti dev moi grh`u>~ pukina; fresi; mhvde∆ 
e[cousa [I have one old woman, whose thoughts are prudent] (Od. 19.353), spoken 
with reference to the Nurse, Eurykleia. The “wisdom” or “compactness of mind” 
of the herald is in fact a trait most often associated with maturity—cf. the mid-line 
formula pukino;n e[po~ used only with Priam (Il. 7.375), Nestor (Il. 11.787), and 
Zeus (Il. 24.74), once (Il. 24.744) of Hektor by Andromakhe. The advanced age 
of the herald—or of the best kind of herald—is an abiding characteristic. For his 
mission to Akhilleus in Iliad 24, Priam chooses Idaios as his charioteer. The herald 
is twice described (Il. 24.282;674), along with Priam, by the E-
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formula, and is himself earlier associated with both A (Il. 7.276) and C (Il. 7.278). 
His age is emphasized in the virtually identical lines #kh`rux tiv~ oiJ e{poito 
geraivtero~. . . [Let one elder herald attend him] (Il. 24.149;178), and also in 
Hermes’ comment ou[t∆ aujto;~ nevo~ ejssiv, gevrwn dev toi ou|to~ ojphdei `[You are 
not young yourself, and he who attends you is aged] later in the same book (368). 
The disguised Odysseus describes the herald Eurybates (in a passage 
striking for its hapax legomena, which contribute to the credibility of the Beggar’s 
tale) as kh`rux ojlivgon progenevstero~ aujtou` [a herald, a little older than he 
was] (Od. 19.244). Compare this with the restriction of this adjective (3X, 4X) 
elsewhere to description of intercessory fi gures such as Nestor (Il. 2.555, 9.161) 
and the Phaiakian Ekheneos (Od. 7.156, [11.342]). The Eurybates passage (Od. 
19.248) further associates age with sound-mindedness (oiJ fresi; a[rtia h[/dh# [his 
thoughts were sensible]), in a formula directly echoed in the phrase fresi;n a[rtia 
bavzein# used by Alkinoos of the sensible man (Od. 8.240). Related in turn (and to 
come full circle) is pepnumevna bavzei~# in Menelaos’ compliment to Nestor’s son 
Peisistratos (Od. 4.204-6)—
§4 w\ fil∆, ejpei; tovsa ei\pe~ o}~ a]n pepnumevno~ ajnh;r
 ei[poi kai; rJevxeie, kai; o}~ progenevstero~ ei[h:
 toivou ga;r kai; patrov~, o{ kai; pepnumevna bavzei~
 Friend, since you have said all that a man who is thoughtful
 could say or do, even one who was older than you are—
 why, this is the way your father is, so you too speak thoughtfully.
—as well as Nestor’s to Diomedes (pepnumevna bavzei~#) in the lines quoted 
earlier (Il. 9.58; see §2). To these may fi nally be added the description of Periphas, 
herald of Ankhises, whom Apollo impersonates to encourage the terrifi ed Aineias in 
a passage that succinctly binds the kh`rux in an associational web of age, paternity, 
and goodwill (Il. 17.322-25): 
§5   . . .ajll∆ aujto;~ ∆Apovllwn
 Aijneivan o[trune, devma~ Perivfanti ejoikwv~,
 khvruki ∆Hputivdh/, o{~ oiJ para; patri; gevronti
 khruvsswn ghvraske, fivla fresi; mhvdea eijdwv~.
   . . .had not Apollo in person
 stirred on Aineias; he had assumed the form of the herald
 Periphas, Epytos’ son, growing old in his herald’s offi ce
 by his aged father, and a man whose thoughts were of kindness.
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To return to the characterization of intercessors in the strict sense of the 
term—i.e. as qualifi ed contextually by the address-formula o{ sfin eju>fronevwn 
ajgorhvsato kai; meteveipen—we note the description of Priam as qeovfin mhvstwr 
ajtavlanto~# [equal of the gods in counsel] (Il. 7.365), in a formula appearing 
elsewhere only with reference to Patroklos (Il. 17.477; Od. 3.110) and Nestor’s 
father Neleus (Od. 3.409). The preeminence Halitherses enjoys in reading birdfl ight 
is matched by his ability to put omens into words (Od. 2.159: kai; ejnaivsima 
muqhvsasqai#). Although the fi gure of Mentor is not linked with formulas shared 
by the other elders, his association with persuasion (peiqwv) is an abiding one; 
this trait will occupy our attention when we come to examine the typical nature of 
responses to the speech of intercessory fi gures. Athene’s frequent impersonation 
of Mentor at critical moments in the Odyssey (Books 2, 3, 22, 24) also emphasizes 
his prominence as a counselor. The aged Ekheneos (Od. 7.155-58), fi nally, “oldest 
of the Phaiakians” (o}~ dh; Faihvkwn ajndrw`n progenevstero~ h\en), is likewise 
marked by his “possession” of speech (#kai; muvqoisi kevkasto).
One last subgroup of Mediators associated with the whole-line formula 
remains to be considered. In addition to experience and soundness of mind, 
prophetic insight can also provide the basis for authoritative speech and thus merit 
attention and respect. Further, though Mediation most often occurs between human 
antagonists, the seer’s hermeneutic position at the boundary between the human 
world and that of divinity marks him especially for an intercessory role. In this 
capacity Kalkhas of course fi gures prominently in the opening of the Iliad (cf. also 
Il. 2.299-330); and his speech is prefaced by the fi rst instance in the poem of the 
formulaic statement of Goodwill (Il. 1.73). It is in fact tempting to locate the point 
of intersection between Prophet and Elder—with the exception of Theoklymenos in 
the Odyssey and Kalkhas here, all Homeric prophets are old men—in we have called 
“circumspection,” the trait embodied in the formulaic o{ra {a{ma} provssw kai; 
ojpivssw {|leuvssei}. The precise sense of this phrase is not so easy to determine. 
Whereas all nine of the occurrences of provssw alone have a clearly spatial meaning, 
the instances (49X) of ojpivssw unevenly skew it between spatial (17X = 35%) and 
temporal (32X = 65%) reference. These fi gures of course have no necessary bearing 
on the sense of the conjunction of the two in provssw kai; ojpivssw#, and the best 
that can be said may well be that the phrase simultaneously intends a “look” in both 
spatial and temporal directions that the term “circumspection” only inadequately 
renders. The ability “to see both ahead and behind” in the mortal world fi nds its 
counterpart in the far broader (and explicitly) temporal sweep of prophetic vision. 
Kalkhas alone in Homer is given the descriptive verse (Il. 1.70) o}~ 
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h/[[dh tav t∆ejovnta tav t∆ejssovmena prov t∆ejovnta [who knew all things that were, 
the things to come and the things past], though the essential core of the formula 
(after the A2 caesura) recurs in Hesiod (Th. 38; cf. Th. 32). The prophet’s claim to 
immediate (visual) access to events that both precede and postdate his own temporal 
horizon—an access that thanks to the Muses (cf. Il. 2.485: uJmei`~ ga;r qeaiv ejste, 
pavrestev te, i[stev te pavnta [For you are goddesses, you are present, and you 
know all things]) the poet himself can enjoy—will occupy our attention in what 
follows. 
A synopsis is in order here. It will perforce be provisional and tentative. 
One insight that emerges clearly from the study of clustered formulas at all levels 
of their manifestation (colon, line, generic scene) is the interdependence of the units 
involved. The traits associated with Mediation seem to cross and overlap with a 
variety of fi gures: Old Man, Young Man, Nurse, Double, Prophet, and Herald. What 
must be especially resisted at this point is the temptation to grant priority to the 
ethos of a fi ctional character or character-type (and so to what may prove to be the 
fi ction of autonomous agency itself) over the context in which that agency comes to 
expression—a temptation only strengthened by habits of reading and interpretation, 
to say nothing for the moment of deeper presuppositions these habits imply. For 
reasons that only the conclusion of this study can hope to justify or even to articulate 
fully, the initial choice to present a typology of Mediation in Homer by splitting up 
the unity of the phenomenon into an ethos and its contextual parameters—themselves 
in turn split further into parameters of situation and response—risks misrepresenting 
the true nature of the issue. Granted this proviso, undoubtedly a cryptic one at this 
point, we can proceed with a summary account of traits that constitute the ethos of 
the Mediator.
Several have been isolated. The most prominent of these, given our choice 
of the formula o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato kai; meteveipen as a point of 
departure, bears on the quality of his intentions. The Mediator is a kindly fi gure, fair-
minded (eju>fronevwn // fresi; ga;r kevcrht∆ ajgaqh`/sin# // fivla fresi; mhvdea 
eijdwv~#, etc.), and thus better capable of grasping a given situation without personal 
bias. Advanced age is privileged, but by reason of features that can also appear 
(precociously) in the young. Such features include fi rst and foremost the trait we 
have inadequately rendered as “circumspection”—a trait defi ned at least in major 
part in terms of temporal range (o{ra {a{ma} provssw kai; ojpivssw {|leuvssei} // 
o}~ h[/dh tav t∆ejonta tav t∆ ejssovmena prov t∆ejovnta). Thanks to the experiential 
breadth his age has won for him (palaiav te pollav te eijdwv~#), to prophetic gifts 
or to (a still vaguely defi ned) “soundness of mind” ({pepnumevna} mhvdea eijdwv~# // 
pukina; fresi; mhvde∆ e[conte~#), the Mediator 
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enjoys the ability to “see both before and after” the present (and always critical) 
situation. Analysis of the actual content of intercessory speeches would show that 
this “sight” generally comprehends either (1) the generic status of the present 
situation (and thus issues in speeches whose rhetorical mode is that of the parable 
or paradigm);6 (2) its specifi c etiology (when the Mediator is also a Prophet), and so 
too the proper response it enjoins along with the consequences of failure to respond 
properly; or else (3) a fi rm sense of what is “right and fi tting” to do.
At this point, and in terms of the broader temporal range that advanced age 
lends the Mediator, it may also be fi tting to speak to the variation #tou o{ ge davkru 
cevwn [shedding a tear for his sake] in two instances of the overall address-formula. 
In addition to kindly intentions, a specifi c kind of grief also marks the speech of 
elderly fi gures. The responsion between Aigyptios and Eupeithes, respectively 
at the beginning and the end of the Odyssey, is a rich one that the present study 
can explore only superfi cially. The fact that the formula in each case thematizes 
memory is itself important, not only in view of the temporal breadth of intercessory 
fi gures, but also in terms of the objectivity this breadth permits. What indeed relates 
Aigyptios and Eupeithes along the axis of the formulaic line they share is their 
antithetical responses to the same deep personal sorrow. Both have lost sons, and 
in both cases Odysseus himself is to some degree (more or less directly) to blame. 
Their responses could not differ more, however. Aigyptios subordinates his grief 
to the welfare of the community at large, which hinges on the return of its absent 
King: no assembly has met on Ithaka since Odysseus left for Troy, he says; may 
Zeus prosper the fortunes of whoever has called them together now (Od. 2.25-34). 
This is a marked expression of community, of piety, of resignation to the will of 
Zeus despite intimate loss, in a story in which the issues of reverence and justice are 
paramount. Eupeithes’ appeal in Book 24 exhibits precisely the opposite attitude. 
For him the (justifi ed) revenge wrought on the suitors only demands another round 
in a socially destructive cycle of vendetta. Personal motives of grief and shame 
override his concerns for justice and communal integrity (Od. 24.425-38). Absorbed 
by sorrow that touches him no less deeply than does the sorrow of Aigyptios—and 
despite even the index of divine sanction for Odysseus’ revenge, to which Medon’s 
speech (439-49) adverts—Eupeithes is incapable of the kind of acquiescence that 
Aigyptios shows. Precisely because of this he suffers the last death in the Odyssey—
signifi cantly, at the hands of a father who has also tasted the grief of an absent son.
There remains the association with persuasive rhetoric, by which all 
intercessory fi gures are without exception characterized. The absence of explicit 
reference to command of speech in the single case of Kalkhas (Il. 
6 See Lohmann 1970:183-209, Pedrick 1983.
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1.68-73) is not a true counterexample. Prophets have little need of eloquence, since 
(for cultural reasons that the narrative always endorses) their mantic status alone 
suffi ces to affi rm the authority of what they have to say, to lend them sight “both 
before and after,” and so to command obedience. Persuasion (peiqwv) in particular is 
a concept that exposes the distortion caused by our choice to examine the typology 
of Mediation under three separate headings, since above all other concepts it points 
up the co-implication of ethos and response. The characterization of Mediators as 
persuasive is in some sense nothing more than a narrative prolepsis of the approval 
their advice wins—and this approval in turn is in a way already predisposed by 
just that proleptic characterization. Persuasiveness is essentially a perlocutionary 
attribute: the Active peivqein [to persuade] necessarily implies the verb in its Middle 
Voice: peivqesqai [to obey]. We will see that this much is clear and perhaps even 
clearest in cases in which the Mediator’s advice is in fact rejected.
2: Situation
Turning now from the kinds of character involved in the typology of 
Mediation to their contextual parameters, we note fundamental similarities among 
the situations in which intercessory fi gures appear. In by far the majority of cases 
(12 of 15X = 80%), the context in which the o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato 
kai; meteveipen formula is used is that of Debate, whether during an offi cial 
Assembly (Il. 1.73;253, 2.78;283, 7.367, 9.95; Od. 2.160;228) or else on any 
occasion in which a dispute arises without the trappings of a formal council (Il. 
7.326, 18.253; Od. 16.399, 24.453). In all these instances the situation is one in 
which events have for one reason or another reached a critical impasse: (S1) the 
plague sent by Apollo (Il. 1), (S2) the confrontation of Akhilleus and Agamemnon 
(Il. 1), (S3) Agamemnon’s “false” dream (Il. 2), (S4) the Assembly to decide the 
issue of retreat or perseverance at Troy (Il. 2), (S5) plans for the burial of warriors 
and the construction of the defensive wall (Il. 7), (S6) the Trojan Assembly (Il. 7), 
(S7) the Embassy to Akhilleus (Il. 9), (S8) the debate between Poulydamas and 
Hektor in the Trojan encampment on the plain (Il. 18), (S9-S10) the fi rst Ithakan 
Assembly (Od. 2), (S11) the suitors’ plot to kill Telemakhos (Od. 16), (S12) the 
planned vengeance of the Ithakans for Odysseus’ slaughter of their sons (Od. 24). 
These contexts admit a variety of scenic structures. The Mediator’s speech can be 
prompted by the turn of events themselves (S1, S3, S5, S8, S9), in which case it is 
most often the fi rst speech in the series (S5, S8, S9) or else is preceded by a formal 
request for intercession (S1, S3). Alternately, it may come as the third element in the 
Statement-Counterstatement-Reconciliation 
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(A-B-C) pattern studied by Lohmann in some Homeric Assembly scenes (S2, S4, 
S6, S7, S10, S11, S12).7 
In four instances of the address-formula o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato 
kai; meteveipen in Assemblies (S1, S3, S6, S10), the Mediator is additionally 
marked by the presence of a formula that introduces a change of speaker: “Htoi o{ 
g∆ w}~ eijpw;n kat∆ a[r∆ e{zeto: toi`si d∆ ajnevsth [He spoke thus and sat down 
again, and among them stood up] (Il. 1.68, 7.365). This whole-line formula appears 
only six times (5X, 1X) in the poems, accounting for the largest share (32%) of the 
total number (19X) of instances of the colon u u e{zeto between the B1 and C2 
caesuras, with e{zeto in this position in turn comprising nearly 60% (19 of 32X) of 
all occurrences of this form of the verb (initial #e{zeto = 34%). In one case (S2) a 
variation is used that allows for expanded description of the actions of the previous 
speaker, but nonetheless preserves the essential elements “/X spoke/ - /X sat/ - /Y 
stood up among them/” (Il. 1.245-48):
§6 ’W~ favto Phlei?dh~, poti; de; skh`ptron bavle gaivh/
 cruseivoi~ h{loisi peparmevnon, e{zeto d∆ aujtov~:
 ∆Atrei?dh~ d∆ eJtevrwqen ejmhvnie: toi`si de; Nevstwr
 hJdueph;~ ajnovrouse. . .
 Thus spoke Peleus’ son, and dashed to the ground the sceptre
 studded with golden nails, and sat down again. But Atreides
 raged still on the other side, and between them Nestor
 the fair-spoken rose up. . .
In addition to the ubiquitous #’W~ favto + /patronymic/, allomorphs 
of elements in these lines include initial #- u u - {d∆} ajnovrouse (8 of 18X) 
completed by #ej~ divfron (3X) and various other phrases on a single basis. The 
closing hemistich e{zeto d∆ aujtov~# is unique.
Also noteworthy is the fact that instances S1 (Kalkhas) and S2 (Nestor) in 
Iliad 1 and S10 (Mentor) in Odyssey 2 share the same overall pattern of expanded 
(3-4 line) description of the speaker between the alternation-formula #“Htoi / ’W~ 
favto. . . and the address-formula #o{ sfin eju>fronevwn. . .:
§7 (a) X fi nishes and sits; (Y) stands Il. 1.68 / 1.245-46 / Od. 2.224 
 (b) Identifi cation of Y  Il. 1.69 / 1.248 / Od. 2.225
 (c) Expanded description of Y Il. 1.70-72 / 1.249-52 / Od. 2.226-7
 (d) Address-formula   Il. 1.73 = 1.253 = Od. 2.228 
7 Lohmann 1970:9-11. One of the earliest (and still very useful) studies is of course that of 
Arend 1933 (esp. 116-21); see also Edwards 1980.
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It has been suggested (Lang 1983) that the expansion at §7(c) accomodates the 
description of a character who has not previously been mentioned in the story, and 
so provides a means for his introduction. The fact is that the three passages cited 
in §7 do indeed coincide with the fi rst appearance of Kalkhas, Nestor, and Mentor, 
respectively, in the text of the poems. In the case of Priam (S6), already well-known 
by the time of the Trojan Assembly in Iliad 7, the §7(c)-element is missing, and the 
scene instead follows the pattern §7(a)-(b)-(d) (= Il. 7.365/366/367). However, the 
assumption—a highly textual one—implicit in the notion of the “fi rst appearance” 
of a character may well be inappropriate to oral literature. This assumption is 
especially conspicuous in Lang’s unlikely suggestion that the fi gure of Nestor does 
not belong originally to “the Trojan War story, or even . . . the Iliad itself,” but 
is instead an “importation,” and for this reason is given an “unprecedented and 
elaborate introduction” in Iliad 1 (1983:140-41). It may risk less distortion to 
concentrate instead on the function that an expanded description appears to serve 
both within its own narrative context and also in its relation to other passages that 
can be identifi ed as allomorphs.
Signifi cantly enough, the remaining two instances of the alternation-
formula precede the speeches of Agamemnon (Il. 1.101) and Alexandros (Il. 7.354) 
respectively, both of whose Counterstatements reject the advice of the previous 
speaker (Kalkhas-Akhilleus/Antenor) and thus signal the need for an intercessor 
(Nestor/Priam). It is especially worth noting how the pattern outlined in §7 also 
structures the introduction to Agamemnon’s reply to Kalkhas (Il. 1.101-5), but with 
a crucial difference at the level of content:
§8 (a) “Htoi o{ g∆ w}~ eijpw;n kat∆ a[r∆ e{zeto: toi`si d∆ ajnevsth 101
 (b) h{rw~ ∆Atrei?>dh~ eujru; kreivwn ∆Agamevmnwn   102
 (c) ajcnuvmeno~. mevneo~ de; mevga frevne~ ajmfi; mevlainai  103
  pivmplant∆, o[sse dev oiJ puri; lampetovwnti eji?>kthn: 104
 (d) Kavlcanta prwvtista kak∆ ojssovmeno~ proseveipe  105
  He spoke thus and sat down again, and among them rose up
  Atreus’ son the hero wide-ruling Agamemnon
  raging, the heart within fi lled black to the brim with anger
  from beneath, but his two eyes showed like fi re in their blazing.
  First of all he eyed Kalkhas bitterly and spoke to him.
This variation in turn suggests that the alternation-formula in the sequence (a)-(b) 
marks a point at which the ensuing action offers distinct alternatives. One speaker 
fi nishes and sits, another rises and is identifi ed, generally by way of patronymic 
and/or a name + epithet formula. What he says may either affi rm or reject the 
previous Statement, and the sequence (c)-(d) allows for a prolepsis of the nature 
of his response by making reference to the basis for his authority—Kalkhas (S1): 
seercraft from 
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Apollo; Nestor (S2): command of rhetoric, longevity; Mentor (S10): authority 
delegated by Odysseus—and the quality of his intention in speaking. The case 
of Agamemnon in §8 is conspicuous in the degree to which the imputation of 
malicious intent fi lls the entire (c) section. In terms of narrative logic, the colon kak∆ 
ojssovmeno~ proseveipe# [he eyed bitterly and spoke to him] in the address-formula 
at 105 follows “naturally” from the two lines that precede it, and a fortiori the same 
can be said of each instance of the formula #o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato kai; 
meteveipen in the passages charted above in §7.
Nestor’s advice on the construction of a defensive wall out of the pyre of the 
cremated dead in Iliad 7 (S5)—a sh`ma whose monumentality threatens to eclipse 
the fame of the Trojan wall built by Poseidon and Apollo (Il. 7.443-63; 12.13-33)—
can also be adduced here. His speech (327-43) is enframed by the formulas already 
identifi ed as markers of Mediation: Crisis (the Trojan threat to the ships)-Assembly 
(informal, and for this reason lacking the formula for alternation of speakers)-
Goodwill (325). Here the address-formula o{ sfin eju>fronevwn . . . is preceded by 
a set of lines (324-25) that advert to Nestor’s ethos as a Counselor: toi`~ oJ gevrwn 
pavmprwto~ uJfaivnein h[rceto mh`tin ⁄ Nevstwr, ou| kai; provsqen ajrivsth 
faivneto boulhv [the aged man began to weave his counsel before them | fi rst, 
Nestor, whose advice had shown best before this]. These lines appear again a few 
books later (Il. 9.93-94) in the scene in which the embassy to Akhilleus is proposed 
(S7), and the second line is repeated at Odyssey 24.52 (S14). Moreover, their match 
with the expansion-element at §7(c) is obvious.
The remaining instances of #o{ sfin eju>fronevwn ajgorhvsato kai; meteveipen 
(Il. 15.285; Od. 7.158, 24.53) occur when the issue is no less critical, for they arise 
in situations that follow upon conspicuous violations of the natural or ethical order 
of things. The speech (S13) of Thoas in Iliad 15 is prompted by Apollo’s sudden 
infusion of strength into the half-dead Hektor, and succeeds in rousing the Greeks 
to defend themselves against the Trojan assault on their ships (285-99). Insofar as 
the intercession of Kalkhas in the fi rst book is sought to account for the unexpected 
plague that strikes the Akhaians, it may also be grouped in this category; and the 
same can be said of the seer Halitherses’ interpretation of the omen of the eagles that 
interrupts the Assembly on Ithaka (Od. 2.146-56). In Odyssey 24.35-59, the shade 
of Agamemnon recounts (S14) how the unnatural keening of Thetis and the Nereids 
almost drove the Greeks to abandon Akhilleus’ funeral rites until Nestor, palaiav 
te pollav te eijdwv~# (51), restrained them from taking fl ight in their ships. Finally 
(S15), when Odysseus concludes his fi rst speech to the Phaiakians by withdrawing 
from their midst and sitting in the ashes of the hearth (Od. 7.153-54), the aged 
Ekheneos breaks the ensuing silence to draw attention 
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to this breach of custom and demand a hospitable response from Alkinoos (155-
66).
The homogeneity of the situations that mark the appearance of an 
intercessory fi gure makes their parameters fairly easy to map. In every case, the 
prior course of events in the story has reached a Crisis, a signifi cant juncture or 
node at which narrative possibilities fork in different directions. The alternative 
vectors are as distinct as they are antithetical: death by plague vs. remedy (S1), 
withdrawal vs. participation of Akhilleus (S2, S7), retreat vs. perseverance of the 
Greeks (S3, S4), neglect vs. performance of burial rites (S5, S14), defeat vs. defense 
(S5, S13), retention vs. restitution of Helen (S6), attack vs. defense (S8), disruption 
through anarchy (S9, S10) or vendetta (S12) vs. social integration, homicide vs. 
survival of Telemakhos (S11), neglect vs. performance of the rites of hospitality 
(S15). A cursory glance at these alternatives (and a busier mind) could easily group 
them under fewer and more generic kinds of opposition. More important than their 
reduction to a single polarity, however—at the risk of overlooking the richness of 
innovation even within formal constraints—is to notice once again the coimplication 
of ethos and context that they point up.
Despite the prominent role played by the ethical formula o{ sfin eju>fronevwn 
ajgorhvsato kai; meteveipen (along with its refl exes) as the mark of an intercessory 
fi gure, that mark is itself conditioned by situational factors. This is clearest when—
in over 60% (5 of 8X) of the cases in which it appears in formal Assembly scenes—
#o{ sfin eju>fronevwn . . . is preceded by the formulaic alternation of speakers, 
expressed four times by the line “Htoi o{ g∆ w}~ eijpw;n kat∆ a[r∆ e{zeto: toi`si 
d∆ ajnevsth and once (Il. 1.245-48 = §6) by a version of that formula stretched to 
accomodate additional description. Here Mediation fi gures merely as one among 
several divergent narrative vectors opened up by the simple fact of Alternation. 
While it is true that there can be no intercession without the fi gure of the Mediator—
which would seem to privilege ethos—the latter’s presence is itself dependent on 
the specifi c situational parameters that call for intercession “in the fi rst place.” 
The two reciprocally constitute each other. Further, intercessors do not even arise 
necessarily from their context, but are instead included in the range of possibilities 
their context admits. The Other who gets up to speak next may well in fact be 
an Antagonist like Agamemnon in his reply to Kalkhas (Il. 1.101-2), or like Paris 
(Il. 7.354-55), who rises to challenge Antenor’s advice in the Trojan Assembly. In 
terms of the course of events in the narrative and the situations that crystallize in 
that course, Mediator and Antagonist occupy alternative nodes through which the 
narrative can pass, and which in their turn (as we will see in the next section) offer 
further narrative options:
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§9
ALTERNATION
ANTAGONIST
MEDIATOR
ANTAGONIST....
MEDIATOR REJECTION....
APPROVAL...
The possibility that the Antagonist’s speech may be answered by yet another 
antagonistic fi gure instead of a Mediator is realized in the complex exchange between 
Agamemnon and Akhilleus in Iliad 1, comprising a total of six separate speeches 
in whose course the intercession of Athene (with an additional three speeches) is 
embedded. Moreover, and more importantly, Alternation in the above schema is 
itself just one of several possibilities engaged along the forking path of a far more 
extensive concatenation of events in Book 1, stretching back at least as far as Khryses’ 
(rejected) Appeal to Agamemnon—if not beyond it, into the unrecorded voices of 
the tradition. Viewed in terms of its interdependent relation with its context, ethos 
too therefore seems less a privileged essence somehow qualitatively distinct from 
the events that swirl around, impinge on and fl ow from it, and more like a simple 
event itself: a verbal construct, a node, a point of juncture in the narrative design. An 
examination of the response to Mediation will carry these refl ections farther.
3: Response
In the course of a critical situation that strains social harmony, custom or 
verisimilitude, an Elder—or one like him, precociously endowed with prudence and 
command of persuasive rhetoric—rises to speak. Narrative logic dictates that the 
response to his speech take one of three forms: outright approval, outright rejection, 
or some partial acceptance (along with partial denial) of (all or part of) his advice 
by (all or part of) his audience. Outright approval accounts for nine (= 60%) of the 
fi fteen cases under review (S3, S4, S5, S6, S7, S11, S13, S14, S15), with partial 
acceptance—taking the form of either (1) acknowledgment of the soundness of the 
advice but failure to implement it (S2), or (2) approval by some but not all of the 
addressees (S12)—comprising an 
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additional 13%. The fact that nearly three-quarters of the speeches introduced by 
an address-formula that explicitly adverts to the speaker’s Goodwill in Crisis earn 
a positive response marks this outcome with high probability in the narrative and 
thus (from the viewpoint of the external audience) a high degree of expectation. 
This of course says nothing of the ultimate soundness of the advice thus given and 
accepted. Good counsel may fall on deaf ears, but it is equally possible that advice 
that in the long run precipitates the demise of those who follow it may initially win 
resounding approbation. The latter case in fact opens a potentially ironic rift between 
the (abstract) level of the story and that of the (concrete) narrative itself—to borrow 
Genette’s terms.8 Priam’s counsel (S6) to offer restitution of everything but Helen 
herself—yet another indication of impaired judgment in that administration—only 
helps to confi rm Troy’s doom, despite the fact that the Trojans approve of it heartily 
(Il. 7.379). Nestor’s advice to construct a defensive wall around the ships (S5) is 
hailed by the Akhaians (Il. 7.344), and in fact proves to be of no small tactical value, 
yet also draws down Poseidon’s wrath when they fail to make proper sacrifi ce before 
building it—a procedural detail Nestor apparently overlooks mentioning. The most 
conspicuous example, however, is Patroklos’ approval of Nestor’s suggestion in Iliad 
16 to borrow and fi ght in the armor of Akhilleus, which brings about the surrogate’s 
death at the same time as it is essential in advancing the story of Akhilleus’ return. 
Ironic Mediation (for lack of a better descriptive term) seems in fact to characterize 
much of Nestor’s advice in the Iliad; we will return to this issue at a later point.
Approbation can take a variety of forms—or better, comes to expression at 
a number of levels—depending on whether the Mediator’s speech is followed by 
another speech (mimesis) that expresses outright approval, or else by the narrative 
description (diegesis) of actions that implement his advice, with or without some 
reference to the attitude of his 
8 Genette 1980:25-29. After a brief review of the often contrary uses of the terms “narrative” 
and “story” in contemporary literary discourse, Genette offers the following working definitions: “I 
propose . . . to use the word story for the signified or narrative content,” which he specifies as the 
“totality of actions and situations taken in themselves, without regard to the medium, linguistic or 
other, through which knowledge of that totality comes to us: an example would be the adventures 
experienced by Ulysses from the fall of Troy to his arrival on Calypso’s island.” The term narrative 
is reserved by him to denote “the signifier, statement, discourse or narrative text itself,” that is, “the 
oral or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or series of events: thus we would term 
narrative of Ulysses the speech given by the hero to the Phaeacians in Books IX-XII of the Odyssey, 
and also these four books themselves, that is, the section of Homeric text that purports to be the 
faithful transcription of that speech.” For additional examples, and an application of these terms to 
analysis of temporality in the Odyssey, see Bergren 1983.
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audience.9 Which form is taken does not seem to matter greatly in the long run: 
the story advances through speech and action almost indifferently. In either case, 
acceptance is always marked by verbal echoes of the spoken advice. Thus Nestor’s 
(mimetic) injunction to the terrifi ed Akhaians at the funeral of Akhilleus (Od. 24.54: 
#e[scesq∆, ∆Argei`oi . . . [Stay, Argives . . . ]) achieves responsion in the diegesis 
of their action subsequent to his speech (57: ’W~ e[faq∆, oiJ e[sconto fovbou 
megavqumoi ∆Acaioiv [So he spoke, and the great-hearted Akhaians stayed from 
fl ight]). The diegesis of Alkinoos’ response to the advice of Ekheneos (Od. 7.169-
70: w\rsen ejp∆ ejscarovfin kai; ejpi; qrovnou ei|se faeinou` | uiJo;n ajnasthvsa~ 
. . . [and raised him up from the fi reside, and set him in a shining chair, | displacing 
his son . . . ]) is cast in language that echoes the old man’s words (162-63: ajll∆ 
a[ge dh; xei`non me;n ejpi; qrovnou ajrgurohvlou | ei|son ajnasthvsa~ [But come, 
raise the stranger up and seat him on a silver-studded | chair]). A similar response 
follows the tempered advice Amphinomos gives the suitors in Odyssey 16, though 
here the responsion does not cross levels but remains instead exegetic in both cases: 
the narrator’s comment that Amphinomos pleased Penelope most because of his 
command of speech (398: #h{ndane muvqoisi) is answered by the description of 
how the suitors receive what he says (406: ’W~ e[fat∆ ∆Amfivnomo~: toi`sin d∆ 
ejpihvndane mu`qo~ [So Amphinomos spoke, and his word was pleasing to them]). 
Although the line is exactly repeated at Odyssey 20.247, and is used (with substitution 
of names) once (Od. 13.16) of Alkinoos and four times (Od. 18.50;290, 21.143;269) 
of Antinoos—where the metrical equivalence of these three names might have some 
bearing on the number of formulas they share in common—the responsion between 
Odyssey 16.398 and 406 is unique.
Most often, and at either or both levels, the vocabulary of approval centers 
formulaically on the activities of praise (ejpaivnein), hearkening (kluvein), and 
obedience (peivqesqai). There is of course nothing unusual in this; the expression 
of assent to speeches of any kind, with or without qualifi cation of the intent of the 
speaker, in most cases has recourse to these verbs.10 Nearly half (4 of 9X) of the 
occasions of outright 
9 The terms are ultimately Plato’s (Rep. 392C-95); for a discussion, see Genette 1980:162-
66.
10 Formulaic lines expressing approval in fact on the whole enjoy such wide application 
throughout the poems—oiJ d∆ ejpanevsthsan peivqontov te poimevni law`n (Il. 2.85), ’W~ e[fat∆, 
∆Argeivoi dev mevg∆ i[acon (2X) . . . | . . . | mu`qon ejpainhvsante~ (Il. 2.333-35), ’W~ e[faq∆, oiJ 
d∆ a[ra pavnte~ ejphv/nhsan (8X) basilh`e~ (Il. 7.344), ’W~ e[faq∆, oiJ d∆ a[r∆ ajnhvi>xan megavlw/ 
ajlalhtw`/ (2X) (Od. 24.463)—that they carry little semantic weight in the context of Mediation 
except as markers of assent. 
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approval when that intention is marked as kindly (eju>fronevwn) are shaped according 
to the extensive pattern introduced by #’W~ e[fat∆ followed by a description of 
audience response. Two from this group (Il. 7.379 = 15.300) are noteworthy in 
that they belong to a set of speeches that win approval expressed by the formula 
’W~ e[faq∆, oiJ d∆ a[ra tou` mavla me;n kluvon hjd∆ ejpivqonto [So he spoke, and 
they listened well to him and obeyed him] (7X, 6X). As L. Muellner (1976:18-19) 
points out, the line “is always used . . . after an order or exhortation by a man [or 
woman (cf. Od. 6.247, 20.157)] in authority (master of slaves, leader of warriors) to 
a group of men [or women] (servants, warriors, etc.).” Priam’s is the fi rst instance 
(S6); the second is that of Thoas (S13), whose preeminence in debate among the 
Greek youth marks him with qualities conventionally reserved for older men. The 
same line is also used twice of the response to statements made by Nestor. One 
occasion (Od. 3.477), following his order for Telemakhos’ chariot to be hitched, is 
not especially signifi cant. No mediation properly so-called is involved (the formula 
#o{ sfin eju>fronevwn . . . is not used), and the passage serves mainly to identify 
the old man as someone whose commands should be obeyed. The other instance (Il. 
9.79) bears more weight, however, since it describes the response of the Akhaian 
leaders to (rather mundane) advice from Nestor that directly precedes his raising 
of the far more delicate issue—in a speech (S7) introduced by the intercessory #o{ 
sfin eju>fronevwn formula—of reconciliation between Agamemnon and Akhilleus 
(92-113). It wins from Agamemnon the reply w\ gevron, ou[ ti yeu`do~ ejma;~ a[ta~ 
katevlexa~ [Old man, this was no lie when you spoke of my madness] (115), which 
is unique in the poems.
In one case (S2), and in a few other passages directly associated with 
intercessory fi gures (Nestor, Priam) but lacking the formal markers of Alternation 
and/or Goodwill, a positive response is expressed by the formulaic nai; dh; tau`tav 
ge pavnta, gevron, kata; moi`ran e[eipe~ [Yes, old man, all this you have said is 
right and fi tting] (Il. 1.286, 8.146, 24.379; cf. Od. 3.331). The line as a whole—with 
substitution of different Vocative forms (gevron 3X, tevko~ 2X, qeav 2X, guvnai 1X, 
fivlo~ 1X; and cf. tevknon ejmovn replacing / pavnta u - / at Od. 22.486) between the 
B2 and C1 caesuras—accounts for well over a quarter (10 of 35X) of all instances 
of kata; moi’ran in the poems, and fully 52% of the cases (19X) in which kata; 
moi`ran e[eip-# completes the line. Four of the remaining nine cases show variations 
on a line concluding {tou`to} e[po~ kata; moi`ran e[eip-# [spoke this word right 
and fi tting]; on fi ve occasions the fi nal colon is preceded by a conjunction (ejpei;) or 
short adverbial modifi er (e.g. ouj). An allomorph of kata; moi`ran e[eip-# appears 
four times in the phrase kata; moi`ran katevlex-# [recounted right and fi tting], 
backing the colon up 
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against the B2 caesura.
This is not the place to study the full range of this formula, for which an 
examination of the allomorphs kata; kovsmon [in right order] (13X) and kat∆ ai\san 
[properly] (4X) would also be needed. For our purposes here, it will suffi ce to make 
a few observations requiring less detailed formulaic analysis. To make the data even 
more manageable, we can begin by excluding from consideration the four instances 
of kata; moi`ran katevlex-# (Od. 3.331, 8.496, 10.16, 12.35), on the ground that 
the sense of the verb here (verifi ed contextually) refers more to the completeness 
or formal arrangement of a prior speech than to its content— in a sense soon to be 
defi ned. Mimetic statements incorporating the colon kata; moi`ran katevlex-# in 
this respect bear a closer resemblance to the use of kata; moi`ran after the A1 (7X) 
and A2 (5X) caesuras in the diegesis of orderly activities like sitting in neat rows (Il. 
19.256; Od. 4.783 = 8.54), tending fl ocks (Od. 9.309;342;352) or cutting meat (Od. 
3.457). Five of the thirteen instances of kata; kovsmon (Il. 10.472, 11.48, 12.85, 
17.205, 24.622) also carry this sense. Such occasions all imply a quasi-objective 
standard to which the activity in question is said to conform, and much the same 
notion is implicit in the use of kata; moi`ran katevlex-# as well, where the issue 
is that of the point-by-point completeness of a narrative account.
This does not seem to be the case with kata; moi`ran e[eip-#, however. 
Its sense instead usually intends the far subtler (ethical) standard of what should 
or ought to be done or said in a given situation, and so registers assent in terms 
of generally tacit assumptions about appropriateness and what is “fi tting.” Thus 
Nestor’s intercession (S2) in Ilia 1.254-84 amounts to a lecture on the rights 
pertaining to the man (= Akhilleus) who is kavrtero~ [stronger] (280) and the one 
(= Agamemnon) who is fevrtero~ [more authoritative] (281), respectively. It is a 
lesson in status and social hierarchy that elicits from Agamemnon the admission 
nai; dh; tau`tav ge pavnta, gevron, kata; moi`ran e[eipe~ (286). Essentially the 
same lesson—though more succinctly expressed—informs Iris’ advice to Poseidon 
to withdraw from battle rather than risk the anger of Zeus (Il. 15.201-4), which wins 
a similar formulaic response from him (206). Diomedes acknowledges as much (Il. 
8.146) in reply to Nestor’s advice to retreat. This is prompted by a bolt from Zeus 
thrown in front of their chariot—which incidentally assimilates Nestor to the fi gure 
of an interpreter of omens—and is couched in a homily on the disproportionate 
powers of gods and men. The compliment is returned twice: fi rst (in the shortened 
form ejpei; kata; moi`ran e[eipe~) when Nestor approves (Il. 9.59) of Diomedes’ 
commitment to fi ght in the belief that Greek victory at Troy is divinely sanctioned; 
and later (with substitution of fivlo~ for gevron in the whole-line formula) in answer 
to 
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the warrior’s observation that younger men than Nestor should have the job of 
waking sleeping generals (Il. 10.169). Related to the fi rst of these two instances is 
the disguised Hermes’ use of nai; dh; tau`tav ge pavnta, gevron . . . (Il. 24.379) 
to acknowledge the appropriateness of Priam’s inference that the gods approve his 
mission to Akhilleus.
Equally interesting is the fact that over 60% (12 of 19X) of the time, kata; 
moi`ran e[eip-# appears in situations that expressly advert to the generational gap 
between interlocutors. Young or at least explicitly younger people (Agamemnon, 
Diomedes, “Hermes,” Leokritos, “Athene”) use it of old ones (Nestor 3X, Priam, 
Mentor) fi ve times (Il. 1.286, 8.146, 24.379; Od. 2.251, 3.331), and on seven 
occasions (Il. 9.59, 10.109, 23.626; Od. 17.580, 18.170, 21.278, 22.486) it marks the 
approval (once ironic) given by an elderly fi gure (Nestor 3X, Eumaios, Eurynome, 
the Beggar, Eurykleia) to the proposal of a younger one (Diomedes 2X, Akhilleus, 
Telemakhos, Antinoos, Penelope, Odysseus). In the remaining instances (Od. 4.266; 
9.351, 13.385, 20.37; 8.397), the formula appears where generational difference is 
not at issue, but in contexts that nonetheless advert to a difference in status (husband/
wife, mortal/god, king/subject). Only once (Od. 8.141) is it used between social and 
generational equals (Euryalos/Laodamas); and twice it is reserved for the poet’s 
own editorial comments (Od. 7.227, 13.48).
At least two conclusions can be drawn from these statistics. The fi rst 
obviously returns us to statements made earlier about traits that accrue to the ethos of 
intercessory fi gures, among whom advanced age is a prominent characteristic. The 
Mediator’s age not only gives him purchase on the kind of moral (and circumspective) 
knowledge to which the colon kata; moi`ran e[eip-# refers, but also empowers him 
to recognize when others far younger also give “right and fi tting” advice. Far more 
important, however, is the fact that his voice is always that of convention. Advice 
endorsed as kata; moi`ran generally embodies traditional folk-wisdom, which lends 
itself easily to summary in gnomic form: Respect authority. Don’t abuse privilege. 
Yield to necessity. Old men do one thing, young men another. Even the mighty are 
fl exible. Give honor to elders. Trust in the gods. Honor guests. Avoid bad company 
. . .. What is spoken kata; moi`ran therefore appeals to and confi rms the ethical 
values to which the audience subscribes. Moreover, this community of fi ctional 
listeners within the narrative is implicitly always represented as sharing the same 
moral expectations as the community in which the narrative itself is performed. 
Their ethical horizons are roughly isomorphic, granted even qualitative differences 
(heroic/mundane) between them that in their turn make for experiential differences 
(e.g., the opportunity for direct 
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intercourse with gods) that maintain what has been called “epic distance.”11 The 
formulaic colon kata; moi`ran e[eip-# adverts at least to this common horizon, and 
this accounts for the moral sense made by what transpires in the narrative—to what 
might be called its ethical closure.
These observations have not digressed too far from the main point. It is 
simply that the approval won nearly three-quarters of the time by the Mediator’s 
speech is assured both by the proleptic encoding of the grounds for that response—
e.g., through formulaic reference to Goodwill and (more generally) to the narrative 
possibilities inherent in patterns of Crisis and Alternation—and also by the degree 
to which that encoding assumes the same approval in the audience that receives the 
narrative. This tacit fusion of ethical horizons is in fact clearest in those cases (4X) 
in which the Mediator’s advice is rejected.
Here more than in contexts in which expectations are fulfi lled, the versatility 
of narrative, or at least the number and range of divergent narrative vectors, becomes 
especially apparent. This is of course not to suggest that the denial of expectations is 
any less traditional a feature of oral narratives, that such denial is any less formulaic 
than fulfi llment of expectation, or that it is not a possibility subject to formulaic 
encoding and thus itself an expectation capable of being prefi gured and fulfi lled. The 
fact is that the outright rejection of a well-intentioned Mediator’s counsel occurs in 
roughly one-quarter (4 of 15X) of the scenes now under consideration, and in half 
this group (Il. 1.101-20; 18.284-313) it is keyed in the diegesis that precedes the 
actual (spoken) denial. In the fi rst case 
11 See e.g. Bakhtin 1981:13: “an absolute epic distance separates the epic world from 
contemporary reality, that is, from the time in which the singer (the author and his audience) lives.” 
The claim, like the terminology itself, is borrowed from the Neoclassicism of Schlegel, Goethe, and 
Schiller; see Todorov 1984:85-91. How implicitly readerly and textual a perspective it embodies 
is clear from such statements as (17): “the epic past is locked into itself and walled off from all 
subsequent times by an impenetrable boundary, isolated (and this is most important) from that 
eternal present of children and descendants in which the epic singer and his listeners are located . . 
.. [T]radition isolates the world of the epic from personal experience, from any new insights, from 
any personal initiative in understanding and interpreting, from new points of view and evaluations 
. . .. The epic world is constructed in the zone of an absolute distanced image, beyond the sphere 
of possible contact with the developing, incomplete and therefore re-thinking and re-evaluating 
present.” It is hard to know where to begin addressing these claims; only a few points can be made 
here. The fusion of ethical horizons between narrated audience and performance audience in itself 
of course does much to dismantle the “boundary” mentioned, along with most of the argument 
whose foundation it provides. See also e.g. Goody and Watt 1968:31-34 and Ong 1982:46-49 on 
the homeostasis of traditional societies, in which the preservation of tradition is not a matter of the 
transmission of static (and, as it were, textual) content from one generation to the next but instead 
an essentially interactive process. It is the result of an open-ended and often highly flexible dialog 
between memory and the immediate temporal horizon of the audience for whom the past is on each 
occasion performed and also re-formed, transmitted and at the same time constructed anew.
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(S1) this is achieved by the extended characterization of Agamemnon’s ill-will 
towards Kalkhas, running from the #ajcnuvmeno~ with which it opens (Il. 1.103) to 
the address-formula (105) that closes with kak∆ ojssovmeno~ proseveipe# [he eyed 
bitterly and spoke to him] (= §8)—with which compare Iris’ denial of such an intent 
towards Priam in the line ouj me;n gavr toi ejgw; kako;n ojssomevnh tovd∆ iJkavnw 
[I come to you not eyeing you with evil intention] (Il. 24.172). In the second (S8), 
Hektor’s reply to Poulydamas is introduced by the shorter but highly pregnant #to;n 
d∆ a[r∆ uJpovdra ijdw;n prosevfh . . . [Then looking darkly at him, he spoke...] (Il. 
18.284), whose resonance Holoka’s recent study has exhaustively explored.12
Hektor’s confrontation with his Double in Iliad 18 indeed offers a prime 
example of a widespread scenic pattern for Rejection of sound advice, and deserves 
close (if still incomplete) examination. It should be noted that the narrative relation 
between these two fi gures is entirely structured in terms of approved and rejected 
Mediation.13 The four scenes in which they appear together in fact exhibit a fi ne 
rhythmic alternation of Approval (A) and Rejection (B) that reaches its climax in 
Book 18:
§10 A1 12.60-81
 B1 12.210-50
 A2 13.722-53
 B2 18.249-313
Moreover, the interlocking formulaic responsion among these scenes is a rich one, 
as the following chart (§11) attempts to show:
§11 A1 B1 A2 B2
(a) IMPASSE horses balk at 
cross-ing Greek 
ditch
omen terrifi es Tro-
jans, who balk at 
attacking
Trojans pinned 
down by Aiantes & 
bowmen
Trojans terrifi ed by 
return of Akhilleus
(b) ADDRESS  dh; tovte Pou-
ludavma~ qra-
su;n {Ektora ei\pe 
parastav~ (60)
=A1 (210) eiv mh; Poulu-
davma~ qrasu;n 
{Ektora ei\pe 
parastav~ (725)
o{ sfin eju>fro-
nevwn ajgorhv-
sato kai; metev-
eipen (253)
12 See Holoka 1983. His insight is that the nominal meaning of the formula is virtually 
empty, and in any case irrelevant to its function in the poems—which is instead to evoke an implicit 
narrative pattern that structures the relations between socially superior and inferior figures.
13 See Redfield 1975:143-53 for a general discussion of the contrast between Hektor and 
Poulydamas.
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(c) APPEAL ajll∆ a[geq∆, wJ~ 
a]n ejgw; ei[pw, 
peiqwvmeqa 
pavnte~ (75)
nu`n au\t∆ ejx- 
erevw w{~ moi 
dokei` ei\nai 
a[rista (215)
aujta;r ejgw;n ejrevw 
w{~ moi dokei` ei\
nai a[rista (735)
ajll∆ i[omen proti; 
a[stu, pivqesqev 
moi: w|de ga;r 
e[stai (260)
(d) REACTION }W~ favto Pou-
ludavma~, a{de d∆ 
}Ektori mu`qo~ 
ajphvmwn (80)
to;n d∆ a[r∆ uJpov-
dra ijdw;n pro-
sevfh koruqaiv-
olo~ }Ektwr (230) 
= A1 (748) = B1 (284)
(e1) RESPONSE  diegesis: Hektor 
dismounts (81)
 speech (231-50) 
plus diegesis (251)
= A1 (749) plus 
speech (750-53)
speech (285-309)
(e2) RESPONSE so do Trojans Trojans follow 
Hektor (251-52)
none  ’W~ }Ektwr ajgov-
reu∆, ejpi; de; 
Trw`e~ kelavdh-
san (310)
 (f) EDITORIAL none none none nhvpioi: ejk gavr 
sfewn frevna~ 
ei{leto Palla;~ 
∆Aqhvnh (311)
A few notes are in order here. (1) At §11(a)B2, the terror of the Trojans at Akhilleus’ 
reappearance is so great that they violate the rules of Assembly by all standing in 
mass instead of sitting down and taking turns to rise and speak (Il. 18.246-47). 
This precludes use of the regular formula for Alternation—“Htoi o{ g∆ w{~ eijpw;n 
kat∆ a[r∆ e{zeto: toi`si d∆ ajnevsth—examined earlier, whose presence here 
would otherwise assimilate this scene even more closely to S1, S3, S6, and S10. 
The §11B2 pattern in Iliad 18 thus constitutes an allomorph of the scene outlined 
above in §7, with the expanded (three-line) description of Poulydamas’ ethos (250-
52) matching the §7(c) element and the line toi`si de; Pouluvdama~ pepnumevno~ 
h\rc∆ ajgoreuvein [First to speak among them was the careful Poulydamas] (249) 
replacing the Alternation formula, to form the sequence §7(a
1
)-(b)-(c)-(d). (2) The 
line quoted at §11(b)A2 is the protasis of an extensive contrafactual narrative pattern 
(always in inverted order) “Then X would have happened if not Y,” in which the 
apodosis is expressed either by e[nqa ke{n} (11X) or kaiv nu ke{n} (28X). It too 
serves to mark Crisis in the narrative, the forking of alternate (and antithetical) 
vectors, and often the appearance of intercessory fi gures. While its importance for 
an understanding of the full resonance of Mediation is undeniable, its analysis must 
be deferred to a separate study. (3) Elements listed alongside the category of Appeal 
(c) have been severely limited to items in which some colonic responsion can be 
shown. A broader kind of 
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responsion at the level of thematic content in Poulydamas’ speeches—especially 
the repeated reference to Hektor’s intractability to persuasion, and to the dichotomy 
between Counselor and Warrior—warrants extensive study. (4) The same can be 
said of the content of the speeches in reply, at §11(e1)B1/A2/B2.
Two aspects of this pattern call for further comment here. The fi rst concerns 
the presence in §11B1 of an element that identifi es an important subgroup of critical 
situations that include Mediation among their narrative possibilities, and additionally 
serves to draw the fi gures of Counselor and Prophet even closer together. Though 
the majority of Mediators are not professional seers, the boundary between these 
two types remains a fl exible one, and is drawn as much by their function in context 
as by reference to some fi xed set of credentials. Thus as the parameters of the 
situation require, the role elsewhere reserved for adepts like Khalkas (Il. 1.92-100), 
Halitherses (Od. 2.146-76), and Theoklymenos (Od. 20.345-57) can be shifted 
to fi gures such as Poulydamas and Nestor (Il. 8.130-44)—and, for that matter, 
Amphinomos (Od. 20.240-46) as well. In the case of Poulydamas in §11(a)B1, in 
fact, the identifi cation is quite explicit, for the Trojan concludes his speech with the 
claim w|dev c∆ uJpokrivnaito qeoprovpo~, o{~ savfa qumw`/ | eijdeivh teravwn kaiv 
oiJ peiqoivato laoiv [So an interpreter of the gods would answer, one who knew | 
in his mind the truth of portents, and whom the people believed in] (Il. 12.228-29). 
Once again, ethos and context are not entirely distinct, but instead seem to be made 
of interchangeable parts.
The remaining pair of instances (S9, S10) involving the dismissal of an 
intercessor’s advice also match this sub-pattern of Omen-Mediation-Approval/ 
Rejection. Both occur during the Ithakan Assembly in Odyssey 2, and represent 
the abusive response of suitors to attempts at Mediation by Halitherses and 
Mentor, respectively, each of whose speeches is introduced by o{ sfin eju>fronevwn 
ajgorhvsato kai; meteveipen (Od. 2.160;228). The close proximity of these two 
scenes—separated only by the speech of Telemakhos (208-23)—along with their 
essential identity of content and structure, in fact suggest the doubling of a single 
pattern:
 §12 [(a) Omen (eagles)     146-56]
 (b) Mediator (Halitherses - Prophet) speaks   157-76
 (c) Antagonist (Eurymakhos) rejects (b)   177-207
 [(d) Telemakhos speaks     208-23]
 (e) Mediator (Mentor - Elder) speaks   224-41
 (f) Antagonist (Leokritos) rejects (e)   242-56
 [(g) Assembly dissolved     257]
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The doubling of elements §12(b)-(c) in (e)-(f) is obvious, and is additionally 
reinforced by the status of Leokritos in the second group. Unlike Eurymakhos (30X), 
who takes second place only to Antinoos (56X) for prominence among the suitors, 
this Leokritos (Euenorides) is a genuine nonentity, merely the shadow Eurymakhos 
casts in this type-scene. Apart from his speech here, his only other appearance in the 
poem comes twenty books later at the moment of his (equally formulaic) death (Od. 
22.294-96): speared from behind by Telemakhos, kidney and diaphragm pierced, 
face fl at in the dust. 
Just as clear is the homology between the initial elements §12(a)-(c) and the 
pattern of Mediation and Rejection in §11B1 and B2. Even more striking, however, 
is the similarity between §12(a)-(f) in its full form and the overall (though more 
complex) pattern of Omen-Mediation-Rejection in the Akhaian Assembly in Iliad 
1. This is especially the case with regard to the sequence of types of intercessory 
fi gure (Prophet : Elder :: Halitherses/Kalkhas : Mentor/Nestor) in both scenes. 
Another parallel between the two Assemblies is perhaps worth noting at §12(f), 
where Agamemnon’s approving response to Nestor (Il. 286: kata; moi`ran 
e[eipe~#) is inverted in Leokritos’ jibe at Mentor, su; d∆ ouj kata; moi`ran e[eipe~# 
[You did not speak properly] (Od. 2.251). Perhaps more signifi cant are features 
that the abusive responses to prophetic Mediation share in these three passages. 
Agamemnon’s rejection in Iliad 1, Hektor’s in Iliad 12, and that of Eurymakhos in 
Odyssey 2 all take the form of (1) an initial impugning of the wits and competence 
of the Prophet/Counselor (Il. 1.106-8 : Il. 12.233-34 : Od. 2.178-79), followed in the 
latter two scenes by (2) dismissal of the mantic value of the omen in question (Il. 
12.237-40 : Od. 2.181-82) and (3) a boastful claim to possession of prophetic skills 
more accurate than those of the Mediator (Il. 12.235-36; 241 : Il. 2.180). 
The effect of redundancies like the one embedded in the structure of the 
Assembly scenes in Iliad 1 and Odyssey 2—not to mention the A-B-A-B patterning 
of Hektor’s relation to Poulydamas (§10)—is generally to emphasize the message; 
this is a feature of all signifying systems, and especially ones that rely chiefl y on 
parataxis. The repeated rejection of a Mediator’s sound advice only draws attention 
to how great a violation of conventional conduct has taken place, and so amounts to 
an implicit justifi cation of the retribution that inevitably follows. This is why a kind 
of tautology governs all scenes of Mediation. Once it is formulaically established 
that the Other who rises to speak in Crisis is indeed a Mediator (and not an 
Antagonist), the outcome stemming from rejection or approval of his advice takes 
a predetermined course. Acceptance (generally) always leads to success, dismissal 
always issues in disaster. The necessity of the outcome is clearer in the case of 
rejection than approval, if only perhaps 
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because transgression is less usual (4 of 15X = 26%) and certainly more scandalous, 
a disruption of traditional values that demands a reassertion of the proper way of 
things. Clearest of all in Homer is the ineluctability of disaster persuant to rejection 
of a Mediator who is also a Prophet. Despite a widespread scepticism about seercraft 
that both poems tolerate (at the level of the narrative) in their characters, the privilege 
that prophecy enjoys at the level of motivation in the story is always confi rmed. 
Nowhere in Homer are prophecies ever disregarded without peril.14 The response-
pattern that links dismissal of the Prophet-Mediator with dismissal of prophecy 
itself or with the unjustifi ed arrogation of the vision of prophets by the characters 
(Hektor, Eurymakhos) who reject their advice only emphasizes this point.
The second and fi nal observation to be made with reference to the synoptic 
table of passages (§11) concerns the editorial comment on the Trojan rejection of 
Poulydamas’ advice in §11(f)B2. Its phrasing— nhvpioi: ejk gavr sfewn frevna~ 
ei{leto Palla;~ ∆Aqhvnh# [fools: for Pallas Athene had taken their wits from them] 
(Il. 18.311; cf. 9.377)—ironically echoes Hektor’s earlier reproach of his Double 
in §11B1—eij d∆ ejtevon dh; tou`ton ajpo; spoudh`~ ajgoreuvei~, | ejx a[ra dhv 
toi e[peita qeoi; frevna~ w[lesan aujtoiv [If in all seriousness this is your true 
argument, then | it is the very gods who ruined the brain within you] (Il. 12.233-34). 
This pair of lines in fact appears once earlier (Il. 7.359-60), signifi cantly enough 
in Alexandros’ rebuke of Antenor in the Trojan Assembly scene (S6). The ethical 
contrast that structures their relationship throughout the poem collapses here into 
a telling identity. These ironies within the narrative open on a larger sort of irony, 
however. The editorial #nhvpioi . . . [fools...] in Iliad 18 belongs to a large group 
(31%) of the total number of the occurrences of this noun (15 of 48X) in the poems, 
which in turn amounts to an even larger percentage (62%) of all instances of the 
noun in initial position (24X). In all of these instances, as in Hektor’s rejection of 
Poulydamas in Iliad 18, the editorial #nhvpi- marks a point in the text at which the 
narrative is interrupted by the poet’s own judgment of the foolishness of a character’s 
interpretation of the situation in which he fi nds himself, generally as the result of 
bad counsel, which issues in a decision on that character’s part to pursue a specifi c 
course of action—a judgment justifi ed by proleptic reference to the (disastrous) 
outcome to which that decision leads. Put more succinctly, the editorial nhvpi- 
always signals a rift in the text between the concrete narrative account on the one 
hand, and the unfolding of the (abstract) story on the other. In this sense it serves 
the same 
14 On prophecy in general in the poems, see e.g. Stockinger 1959; for its narratological 
function, with specific reference to the Phaiakian and Teiresian prophecies in the Odyssey, see 
Peradotto 1974 and 1980.
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function— though with opposite sense—as the contrafactual pattern “Then X would 
have happened if not Y” alluded to above with reference to §11(b)A2. Both mark a 
textual irony, an opening through which the priority of motivation at the level of the 
story over narrative motivation can be seen.
In one case, this textual irony affects the typology of Mediation at its core. 
We have seen that the nature of the response (Approval/Rejection) to Mediation 
is suffi cient to determine the nature of the ultimate outcome (Success/Failure) of 
the action, as schematized above in §9. Rejection of a Mediator’s advice always 
precipitates disaster for those who spurn it: Agamemnon (S1), whose mistake is 
admitted (Il. 19.76-144) only after the slaughter of countless Akhaians; Hektor 
(S8), who acknowledges only too late (Il. 22.99-103) the soundness of Poulydamas’ 
counsel; the suitors, whose demise is implicitly sealed by their dismissal of 
prophetic Mediation in the Ithakan Assembly scene (S9, S10); Eupeithes (S12), the 
last casualty in the Odyssey.  On the other hand, approval leads just as inevitably 
to the success of an endeavor in the ten cases in which it occurs (S2-S7, S11, S13-
S15). Ironic possibilities complicate this schema, however. If the advice proposed 
by a Mediator itself proves to be in some sense unsound, its acceptance can have 
the same result as unimpeachably good advice that is rejected or (as in Iliad 18) bad 
advice that wins approval. Accomodating this possibility, the fuller range of options 
thus maps out as follows:
§13
MEDIATION
(SOUND)
(UNSOUND)
APPROVAL
REJECTION
APPROVAL
SUCCESS
FAILURE
Nestor’s advice to Patroklos at the close of Iliad 11 and its implementation 
much later (Iliad 16) make for perhaps the most telling case in point. Sent for news by 
an Akhilleus whose curiosity betrays anxiousness that undercuts the fi rmness of his 
resolve to stay out of battle, Patroklos visits Nestor’s camp. Much like Telemakhos 
in Odyssey 3, he fi nds the old man enframed in a tableau of domestic ritual: at table 
with a guest (Makhaon), served by his attendant Hekamede, engaged in the pleasure 
of talk over wine, pale honey, bread, and onion (Il. 11.618-44). Though he initially 
declines an offer to join them (647-54), Patroklos is nonetheless trapped by one of 
Nestor’s prolonged reminiscences (670-762), 
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which eventually comes full circle to recount his arrival once at the house of Peleus 
during ritual sacrifi ce (769-77). The responsion is exact, with Nestor’s rising up to 
take Patroklos by the hand echoed in Akhilleus’ gesture to Nestor himself in the 
analepsis: ej~ d∆ a[ge ceiro;~ eJlwvn, kata; d∆ eJdriavasqai a[nwge [and took him 
by the hand, led him in and told him to sit down] (646 = 778). Reminiscence of 
personal glory here modulates into recollection of Peleus’ charge to Patroklos to 
protect the young Akhilleus at Troy (785-90), and then into Nestor’s own advice 
in the present context (790: ajll∆ e[ti kai; nu`n), that is, that Patroklos borrow the 
armor, impersonate the Hero, and so win for the Greeks some breathing-space in the 
fi ght to defend their ships (794-803).
Patroklos’ response is given by the formula (6X, 1X) ’W~ favto, tw`/ d∆ a[ra 
qumo;n ejni; sthvqessin o[rine [So he spoke, and stirred the feelings in his breast] 
(804). Four books then intervene, recounting the fated advance of the Trojans, before 
the narrative resumes again (Iliad 16) with the implementation of Nestor’s advice. 
The lacuna is bridged by the simple device of repetition; except for the change of 
pronouns and the variation of one line (Il. 11.799/16.40), the appeal to Akhilleus 
precisely echoes Nestor’s earlier counsel (11.794-803 = 16.36-45). The repetition 
has the effect of collapsing the distance that separates these two narrative moments, 
hence effecting a return to the initial (mediatory) situation in Iliad 11. The appeal 
elicits an editorial comment (Il. 16.46-47):
§14 ’W~ favto lissovmeno~ mevga nhvpio~: h] ga;r e[mellen
 oiJ aujtw`/ qavnatovn te kako;n kai; kh`ra litevsqai.
 So he spoke, supplicating, the great fool; this was
 his own death and evil destruction he was entreating.
The judgment mevga nhvpio~ is a strong one. It occurs in this form only here, 
though allomorphs of the phrase in the same position (B1-C2) appear on four other 
occasions, with various particles (to; de; 2X / se; de; ⁄ e[ti) fi lling out the space 
before the noun. In all but one case (Od. 19.530), which describes an infant child, the 
comment adverts to foolishness portending disaster: Odysseus’ crew drunk on the 
beach while the Kikonians muster their troops (Od. 9.44); blind Polyphemos duped 
by the ruse of the sheep (Od. 9.442); the suitors, who take the death of Antinoos from 
the Beggar’s arrow for an accident (Od. 22.32), and who stupidly devour Odysseus’ 
stores, unmindful of the master’s return (Od. 22.370). The closing hemistich h\ ga;r 
e[mellen# (with allomorphs oujd∆ a[r∆ 5X or tw/` d∆ a[r∆ 1X and different infl ections 
of the verb) is likewise reserved for proleptic reference to unseen disaster. Its sense 
is contrafactual, drawing attention to grief or else total demise that is chosen 
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unwittingly, hence to the ironic distance between expectation and outcome. The 
defensive wall of the Greeks proposed by Nestor (S5) was not destined to stop 
the Trojan assault (Il. 12.3); Dolon’s boast to return unscathed from his espionage 
behind enemy lines would prove a hollow one (Il. 10.336); on the verge of death, 
Hektor acknowledges that his hopes for mercy from Akhilleus had been empty (Il. 
22.356); Odysseus’ return from Troy was fated to be painful and prolonged (Od. 
4.107); the fair west wind that blew from Aiolos’ island to Ithaka was only to fail 
him just within sight of home (Od. 10.26); Eupeithes, aggrieved father, sought sweet 
vengeance but in so doing incurred his own death (Od. 24.470).
What links these passages together, and to Patroklos’ innocent appeal (Il. 
16.35-45) to be allowed to impersonate Akhilleus, is the rift they all signal between 
narrative motivation and motivation at the level of the story. The prominence they 
give to the exigencies of the story (the sacrifi ce of Patroklos to the Plan of Zeus) 
in turn confi rms the priority of function over ethos, situation, and response within 
the narrative, at the same time as it also makes Mediation itself a primary tool of 
that over-arching function. The intercession of Nestor in Iliad 11/16 emphasizes 
even more strikingly than do the other passages examined the role of the Mediator 
throughout the poems as a kind of “switch” located at a critical juncture in the 
narrative and (more than other characters) ultimately in the direct employ of the 
story that guides the unfolding of the narrated events. Plague vs. remedy, social 
disruption vs. social harmony, defeat vs. victory, ritual propriety vs. neglect of 
obligations that bind mortals to the gods— the Mediator arises always and only 
whenever the course of events has reached a fork that leads the narrative along 
divergent paths and towards different projected ends: failure (often death) on the one 
hand, success— sometimes death too, but always measured by the specifi c closure 
toward which the story moves—on the other. In this sense, and viewed in terms of 
its function, Mediation represents a cloaked editorial presence in the narrative, and 
the Mediator himself a kind of editorial fi gure. This is never clearer than when that 
Mediation is ironic, since here the distance between expectation and fulfi llment, 
desire and dessert, plan and outcome, narrative and story is possibly its greatest. 
Homer’s comment mevga nhvpio~ in Iliad 16 only announces more explicitly a 
prolepsis of disaster already inherent in the Mediator’s advice four books earlier, 
and inhering potentially in all advice given, whatever the authority of its proponent, 
whenever another rises to speak or to take one’s hand in friendship. 
4: Conclusion
A few conclusions can briefl y be ventured now to what has been an 
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extensive but at the same time also an admittedly incomplete typology of Mediation 
in Homer. Its very incompleteness is in fact itself a point worth dwelling on.
Despite the emergence of relatively stable contours for that typology, its 
extent still remains largely uncharted. Each new instance of specifi c responsion 
among cola, lines, and generic scenes only seems to open on ever wider and more 
intricate and more interdependent patterns of responsion. These call for further study, 
but at the same time also implicitly challenge the approach taken in this analysis. 
Structurally, the typology is governed by what we have called co-implication, by 
the fact that its isolated parts all stand in metonymic relation to some whole that 
never reaches full expression in the text. And it is thanks to this that our approach 
in terms of categories of ethos, situation, and response remains at best a very rough 
heuristic strategy.
To take only the most striking example, we have suggested that the category 
of ethos (“no more or less arbitrary than any other point of departure”—and no 
less dangerous, too) apparently enjoys no special privilege. Its boundaries are so 
fl exible—shifting among the fi gures of Youth and Elder, Prophet, Counselor, Nurse, 
Double, Father, Husband, Herald, King—that it is tempting to conclude that what 
passes for character is merely a cluster of traits (goodwill, memory, sorrow, prudence, 
command of persuasive speech, circumspection, soundness of mind) around a 
proper name, which in its turn—and far from signifying some unique essence—
only marks as it were an empty locus of narrative potentials.15 What strengthens 
this impression is the degree to which ethos itself in all its fl exibility seems to be a 
function of contextual constraints. Mediator no less than (say) Antagonist rises to 
speak or fails to rise only within and by reason of prolepses embedded in a certain 
situation (for example, Crisis). Situation is in turn no independent variable, but 
instead is plausibly determined by prior concatenations of events in the narrative, 
which stretch back towards some vanishing-point in the tradition of the story. This 
is why, for example, the last passage examined in our study (Iliad 11/16) is no less 
valid an instance of Mediation despite its lack of most of the explicit formulaic 
cues (Debate, Alternation, Ethical Expansion, Goodwill) that seemed so defi nitive 
for our study in the fi rst place. All that counted there, as we saw, was the functional 
identifi cation of the 
15 See e.g. Barthes 1974:190-91: “Character is an adjective, an attribute, a predicate.... What 
gives the illusion that the sum [sc. of traits predicated of a narrative character] is supplemented by a 
precious remainder (something like individuality....) is the Proper Name, the difference completed 
by what is proper to it. The proper name enables the person to exist outside the semes, whose sum 
nonetheless constitutes it entirely.” See e.g. Rimmon-Kenan 1983:29-42 (from whom this quote is 
drawn [39]) for a brief summary of the problem of the narrative status of “character” and references 
to more extensive discussions.
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speaker with a kind of narrative “switch,” a juncture at which alternative endings 
offer themselves for realization, and at which the “choice” of one or the other lets 
the priority of story over narrative show itself. Moreover, it shows itself over and 
perhaps in a sense sometimes even despite motivation in the narrative, for it is 
just this ironic difference it generates that makes Patroklos’ death (unlike Hektor’s) 
a genuine sacrifi ce, more striking because less justifi ed internally, that is, at the 
narrative level. His is a sacrifi ce, after all, at the altar of the Story of the Iliad, with 
the Mediator acting as offi ciant.
Two consequences follow from this: one procedural, one broader in scope. 
First, it should be clear that the richness of co-implication requires a method just 
as protean in order to capture it. To isolate and classify general types is useful and 
even necessary as a fi rst step, but ultimately risks limiting the full range of narrative 
possibilities and opportunities for innovation available to poet and audience. 
Especially given its dependence on a text, this approach tends only to reify the 
types and patterns it uncovers, to bind and fi x them in the room of the possibilities 
they happened to displace on one occasion. Need all Mediation be expressly cued in 
the text by formulaic reference to Goodwill? Must there be explicit mention every 
time of the traits we have isolated as peculiar to Mediators? Must someone always 
speak fi rst and sit down, and then another rise to speak? Or if not to speak, to take 
one’s hand in hospitality? Need there always be an omen or a plague, or will any 
crisis do, even any simple quandary over choices, to signal his appearance? Despite 
the high frequency of formulaic echo guiding much of this study—the patterns of 
colonic match, phrase-count, and specifi c responsion—is Mediation after all less 
an object susceptible to quantifi cation than (to borrow M. Nagler’s term) a kind of 
loose Gestalt?16 And if so, how avoid the risk of overlooking the particulars in favor 
of reconstituted universal types, thus sacrifi cing narrative to myth, spontaneity to 
some monolithic Tradition?17
However these questions are answered, and in whatever spirit this risk is 
run, tradition (however broadly or narrowly conceived) indeed remains the central 
issue. The community’s living tradition, after all, is the 
16 See Nagler 1974. Nagler uses the term initially to refer to the “open-endedness” of 
“formula systems” or “families” of formulas in Homer, and comments (13): “I would propose that 
this open-endedness is not merely a descriptive device, that the family is in fact open-ended because 
the abstract template that generates its members is not limited in its production of particular phrases 
but can be realized in more or less similar forms in an endless variety of contexts . . .. [T]here does 
not seem to be a more accurate term for such an entity than ‘Gestalt’.” The term soon undergoes 
further expansion to include “patterns and paraphrasable meanings” (17) at the level of generic scene 
and story. See also 34-45, 86, 201.
17 This is a danger to which Frame 1978 and Nagy 1979, for instance, seem often to have 
succumbed.
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implicit whole comprising the very possibility of the story (or stories) with which 
the isolated parts of the narrative contract their relation and from which they take 
their bearings, so to speak.18 It clearly supplies the key for their understanding at 
the same time as it depends on these parts, on the story that guides them, and on the 
values these stories embody, for its own confi rmation and renewal. Viewed in these 
terms, the question remains how most successfully to reach story through narrative, 
and tradition itself through the permutations of stories—and how to let that tradition 
somehow reach and quicken us too. What kinds of Mediation best suit this task?
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